



# Does macroprudential policy affect wealth inequality? Evidence from synthetic controls<sup>☆</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

This paper examines the effects of macroprudential policy (MaPP) on wealth inequality using a large dataset of 171 countries. I find that, after the adoption of MaPP, wealth concentration in the treated countries increases by 3.4 percentage points in a decade. This finding is explained by a rise in the wealth share of the top 1% combined with a sharp decline in the wealth share of the bottom 50%. These effects are stronger for prudential rules based on income, particularly in advanced economies.

## 1. Introduction

Following the Great Recession, central banks tightened macroprudential policy (MaPP). A decade later, these policies remain tight to ensure financial stability. But if MaPP restricts credit to a fortunate few, it may have searing consequences on the redistribution of wealth. A couple of questions logically emerge. Does MaPP affect wealth inequality? If so, what are the transmission channels through which MaPP affects wealth?

This paper attempts to answer these questions using a synthetic control approach. Specifically, I use a combination of countries that never implement MaPP to mimic the most relevant characteristics of the countries with MaPP. I then compare the trajectory of wealth inequality in these counterfactuals to the actual evolution of wealth inequality in the treated countries. This allows me to obtain an estimate of the causal effects of MaPP on wealth inequality based on a large sample of 171 countries between 1995–2020.

To be sure, these are important empirical questions that cannot be answered using conventional time-series analyses. I say this for two reasons. First, MaPP is often implemented in response to contemporaneous events. Consequently, conventional analyses struggle to isolate the effects of MaPP from all other possible factors driving wealth inequality. In contrast, synthetic controls minimize the problem of reverse

causality and cast light on the causal relationship between MaPP and wealth inequality. Second, a country with MaPP will always be different from any other country without MaPP. As such, a simple comparison between countries with and without MaPP should always be ruled out — for the simple reason that the estimated effects of MaPP may reflect pre-existing differences across countries. Remarkably, synthetic controls ensure that the time-varying response of wealth inequality to unobserved factors will be fairly similar between treated countries and their synthetic versions.

In principle, MaPP may affect wealth inequality through different channels in any one direction. The first channel is aggregate production. There is ample evidence that credit is an important determinant of firm production, which in turn influences the demand for low- and high-skilled workers (e.g., Townsend and Ueda, 2006). There are two possible cases to be considered. If credit is too tight, firms may cut production and reduce the demand for labor. In this first case, wages should go down and wealth inequality may increase. However, tighter credit makes capital more expensive. This may increase labor demand and push wages up. In this second case, wealth inequality may decline as firms substitute capital for labor. It is therefore not clear whether, or to what extent, MaPP affects wealth inequality through aggregate production.

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The second possible channel is entrepreneurship. If MaPP makes access to credit more difficult, a talented but poor entrepreneur may be unable to invest in a small business (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994). Evidently, this may aggravate wealth inequality. The difficulty with this argument is that the proportion of entrepreneurs in the economy is relatively small. So, changes in MaPP should have a negligible effect on the redistribution of wealth. On top of that, small, informal businesses have limited access to formal credit and should not be much affected by MaPP. It follows, I believe, as a matter of basic logic that MaPP will most likely hit those entrepreneurs with intermediate levels of wealth. If that is the case, then MaPP may either increase or decrease wealth inequality. It may increase wealth inequality because people with intermediate wealth move away from the top of the distribution, or it may decrease wealth inequality because the people in the middle get closer to the relatively poor. The net effect of these contrasting forces on wealth inequality is ambiguous.

The last channel is human capital accumulation. There is a great deal of evidence that credit can be used to break the historical link between parental wealth and human capital accumulation (e.g., Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986; Galor and Zeira, 1993). It is perfectly possible that credit helps the poor to acquire education and move up the wealth ladder. If so, then tighter credit due to MaPP may increase wealth inequality. However, I have argued before that MaPP will most likely hit those with intermediate levels of wealth. By the same reasoning, wealth inequality may increase if those with intermediate wealth cannot access a student loan and are pushed away from the top of the distribution; or wealth inequality may decrease because the gap between those in the middle and the poor becomes smaller as more and more people get excluded from student loans. Once again, the net effect of these opposing forces on wealth inequality is far from clear.

Until now, surprisingly little attention was given to the redistributive effects of bank regulation (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). Only a handful of papers find that bank regulation widens the income distribution (e.g., Galor and Moav, 2004; Beck et al., 2010). But much less is known about the effects of MaPP. Some papers using individual-level data show that MaPP leads to a reallocation of credit from low- to high-income individuals (e.g., Acharya et al., 2020; Behncke, 2020; and Defusco et al., 2020). While these results are interesting and important, they do not tell us much about the way MaPP affects the distribution of wealth. Recently, some papers find cross-country evidence of a positive relationship between MaPP and income inequality (Delis et al., 2014; Frost and Stralen, 2018; Hasan et al., 2020). But it is also quite possible that MaPP leads to a more stable financial system in the future. This, in turn, could create more economic opportunities for the poor and reduce wealth inequality over time. The point I wish to make here is that all these arguments are fairly speculative. One cannot say as a matter of principle whether MaPP will increase or decrease wealth inequality. It is an empirical question. And the empirical evidence of the effects of MaPP on wealth inequality remains fuzzy at best.

In this paper, I show that, after the adoption of MaPP, wealth concentration in the treated countries increases by 3.4 percentage points in a decade. During the same period, the wealth share going to the top 1% rises steadily at the expense of a lower wealth share held by the bottom 50%. As we shall see, this rise in wealth inequality is more pronounced in countries that implement debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratios rather than loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. The effects of MaPP are also generally stronger on advanced economies. Taken together, these results support the view that MaPP leads to greater wealth inequality and should be adjusted in much the same way as the interest rate.

The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it provides evidence on the effects of MaPP on wealth inequality. A limitation of prior work is that it focuses almost exclusively on income inequality. However, MaPP is more likely to affect capital income than wages or earned income. Why? Because MaPP is tightened to prevent large fluctuations in asset prices, particularly in housing (e.g., Vandebussche

et al., 2015; Kelly et al., 2018). If MaPP makes it more difficult for people to get a home loan or profit from increases in asset prices, any measure of income inequality will most likely underestimate the true effects of MaPP. The analysis presented in this paper shows that MaPP has deleterious effects on wealth inequality and that the size of these effects depends crucially on the design of the prudential rule and the country's income level.

Second, a main contribution of this paper is the use of synthetic controls to establish causality from MaPP to wealth inequality. By using synthetic controls, I minimize concerns about reverse causality and omitted variable bias. So far, synthetic controls have only been used to study the impact of a one-time policy in a single region or country (e.g., Card, 1990; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010). Instead, I use synthetic controls to examine the effects of MaPP in a setting with multiple treated countries and variation in treatment timing.

And this brings me to my last point. Relative to conventional time-series analysis, synthetic controls are a more objective and transparent way to estimate the effects of MaPP. The reasons for this are the following. The first is that synthetic controls provide visual evidence that the control units are capable of reproducing the wealth trajectories in the countries with MaPP had they not implemented these policies. This visual evidence is more compelling than numbers and it is supported by simulation-based uncertainty estimates. The second reason is that synthetic controls reduce discretion in the choice of control units. I simply let a data-driven procedure choose the combination of control units that best matches the characteristics of the countries with MaPP. This choice is independent of the post-treatment evolution of wealth inequality. Since synthetic controls are a pool of weighted control units, I can check and report the relative contribution of each control unit to the counterfactual of wealth inequality in the treated countries.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the synthetic control approach with staggered adoption. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 examines the effects of MaPP on wealth inequality and provides robustness checks. Section 5 extends the analysis to different policy tools and country income levels. Section 6 concludes.

## 2. Methodology

### 2.1. Identification

This section provides an abridged description of the generalized synthetic control (GSC) method.<sup>2</sup> Suppose  $Y_{it}$  is the outcome of interest of country  $i$  at time  $t$ . Let  $\tau$  and  $C$  denote the set of countries in the treatment and control groups, respectively. The total number of countries in the sample is  $N = N_{tr} + N_{co}$ , where  $N_{tr}$  and  $N_{co}$  are the number of countries in the treated and control groups, respectively. Each country is observed for  $T$  periods. Assuming that  $T_{0,i}$  is the number of pre-treatment periods for country  $i$ , the exposure to treatment is observed for  $T - T_{0,i}$  periods. The countries in the control group are never exposed to treatment in the observed time span.

The outcome of interest,  $Y_{it}$ , is given by a linear factor model:

$$Y_{it} = \delta_{it}D_{it} + x'_{it}\beta + \lambda'_i f_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $D_{it}$  is a treatment variable that equals 1 when a country  $i$  is treated prior to time  $t$  and 0 otherwise;  $\delta_{it}$  is the heterogeneous treatment effect on country  $i$  at time  $t$ ;  $x'_{it}$  is a  $(k \times 1)$  vector of observed covariates;  $\beta = [\beta_1, \dots, \beta_k]'$  is a  $(k \times 1)$  vector of unknown parameters;  $f_t = [f_{1t}, \dots, f_{rt}]'$  is a  $(r \times 1)$  vector of unobserved common factors;  $\lambda_i = [\lambda_{i1}, \dots, \lambda_{ir}]'$  is a  $(r \times 1)$  vector of unknown factor loadings and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  captures the unobserved idiosyncratic shocks of country  $i$  at time  $t$ . The

<sup>2</sup> The interested reader is referred to the original paper by Xu (2017) for additional details.

factor component of the model takes a common linear additive form<sup>3</sup>:  $\lambda'_i f_i = \lambda'_{i1} f_{i1t} + \lambda'_{i2} f_{i2t} + \dots + \lambda'_{ir} f_{irt}$ .

Let  $Y_{it}(1)$  and  $Y_{it}(0)$  be the potential outcomes of interest for country  $i$  at time  $t$  when  $D_{it} = 1$  and  $D_{it} = 0$ , respectively. Then, the data-generating process (DGP) for each country can be written as follows:

$$Y_i = D_i \circ \delta_i + X_i \beta + \lambda_i F + \varepsilon_i, i \in 1, 2, \dots, N_{co}, N_{co} + 1, \dots, N. \quad (2)$$

where  $Y_i = [Y_{i1}, Y_{i2}, \dots, Y_{iT}]'$ ;  $D_i = [D_{i1}, D_{i2}, \dots, D_{iT}]'$  and  $\delta_i = [\delta_{i1}, \delta_{i2}, \dots, \delta_{iT}]'$ . “ $\circ$ ” means point-wise product;  $\varepsilon_i = [\varepsilon_{i1}, \varepsilon_{i2}, \dots, \varepsilon_{iT}]'$  are  $(T \times 1)$  vectors;  $X_i = [x_{i1}, x_{i2}, \dots, x_{iT}]'$  is a  $(T \times k)$  matrix; and  $F = [f_1, f_2, \dots, f_T]'$  is a  $(T \times r)$  matrix. The control and treated countries are subscripted from 1 to  $N_{co}$  and  $N_{co} + 1$  to  $N$ , respectively.

The outcome of interest for all the countries in the control group is:

$$Y_{co} = X_{co} \beta + F \Lambda'_{co} + \varepsilon_{co} \quad (3)$$

in which  $Y_{co} = [Y_{i1}, Y_{i2}, \dots, Y_{N_{co}}]'$  and  $\varepsilon_{co} = [\varepsilon_{i1}, \varepsilon_{i2}, \dots, \varepsilon_{iN_{co}}]'$  are  $(T \times N_{co})$  matrices;  $X_{co}$  is a three-dimensional  $(T \times N_{co} \times p)$  matrix; and  $\Lambda'_{co} = [\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_{N_{co}}]$  is a  $(N_{co} \times r)$  matrix. The optimal number of factors,  $r$ , is selected based on a cross-validation procedure that minimizes the mean squared prediction error (MSPE).

The causal parameter of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated countries (ATT) at time  $t$ , when  $t > T_0$ :

$$ATT_{t, t > T_0} = \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i \in \tau} [Y_{it}(1) - Y_{it}(0)] = \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i \in \tau} \delta_{it} \quad (4)$$

Note that  $Y_{it}(1)$  is observed for the treated countries. The goal here is to estimate the unobserved  $Y_{it}(0)$  for each treated country in the post-treatment periods. This estimation can be done under fairly standard conditions.<sup>4</sup> It is to this task that I turn next.

### 2.2. Estimation

The GSC estimator of the ATT for country  $i$  at time  $t$  is given by the difference between the actual outcome and the estimated counterfactual, as below:

$$\delta_{it} = Y_{it}(1) - \hat{Y}_{it}(0) \quad (5)$$

where  $\hat{Y}_{it}(0)$  is imputed after three steps. In the first step, I obtain  $\hat{\beta}$ ,  $\hat{F}$ , and  $\hat{\Lambda}_{co}$  from an interactive fixed effects (IFE) model using only data from the control group:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\beta}, \hat{F}, \hat{\Lambda}_{co} = \operatorname{argmin}_{\hat{\beta}, \hat{F}, \hat{\Lambda}_{co}} \sum_{i \in C} (Y_i - X_i \hat{\beta} - \hat{F} \hat{\Lambda}_{co})' (Y_i - X_i \hat{\beta} - \hat{F} \hat{\Lambda}_{co}) \\ \text{s.t. } \frac{\hat{F}' \hat{F}}{T} = I_r \text{ and } \hat{\Lambda}'_{co} \hat{\Lambda}_{co} = \text{diagonal} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

In the second step, I estimate the factor loadings for each treated country. These are the contributions (or “weights”) of each control unit in the synthetic control. The loadings minimize the MSPE of the treated outcome in the pre-treatment periods:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\lambda} = \operatorname{argmin}_{\tilde{\lambda}_i} \sum_{i \in C} (Y_i^0 - X_i^0 \hat{\beta} - \hat{F}^0 \tilde{\lambda}_i)' (Y_i^0 - X_i^0 \hat{\beta} - \hat{F}^0 \tilde{\lambda}_i) \\ = (\hat{F}^{0'} \hat{F}^0)^{-1} \hat{F}^{0'} (Y_i^0 - X_i^0 \hat{\beta}), i \in \tau \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

<sup>3</sup> The term  $\lambda'_i f_i$  captures the effects of unobserved factors correlated across countries. This reduces concerns about selection bias in the choice of conditioning factors and allows for MaPP to be endogenous to unobserved time-varying and unit-specific factors.

<sup>4</sup> The estimation requires four additional assumptions. First, the adoption of MaPP must be independent of the error term. Second, there must be weak serial dependence of the error terms, which is confirmed after ruling out the presence of unit roots in the data. Third, standard moment conditions ensure the convergence of the estimator. Lastly, the error terms are assumed to be cross-sectionally independent and homoscedastic because all wealth variables are bounded between 0 and 1 to reduce the variability of the error terms.

where the superscripts “0” denote the pre-treatment periods and  $\hat{\beta}$  and  $\hat{F}^0$  are taken from the first step. The loadings can be negative or positive. The GSC model uses the factors and outcomes in the pre-treatment period to choose the loadings for the control units and then uses cross-sectional correlations between treated and control units to predict the treated counterfactuals.

In the last step, I obtain the treated counterfactuals based on  $\hat{\beta}$ ,  $\hat{F}$ , and  $\hat{\lambda}_i$ :

$$\hat{Y}_{it}(0) = x'_{it} \hat{\beta} + \hat{\lambda}'_i \hat{f}_t, i \in \tau, t > T_0 \quad (8)$$

Finally, the  $\widehat{ATT}_t$  is estimated as following:

$$\widehat{ATT}_t = \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i \in \tau} [Y_{it}(1) - \hat{Y}_{it}(0)] \text{ for } t > T_0 \quad (9)$$

Statistical significance is assessed using a parametric bootstrap procedure that estimates the standard errors for each ATT. The prediction error of the IFE model for the treated counterfactuals is computed based on simulated data from the control group. I take one control unit out as a fake treated unit and use the rest of the control units to predict the outcome of the excluded unit. The difference between the predicted and observed outcome is the prediction error of the IFE model. Lastly, the prediction error for the treated counterfactuals is drawn from the empirical distributions of the prediction errors.

### 3. Data

I collect data for 171 countries between 1995–2020. The wealth outcomes are from the World Inequality Database (WID). The outcome variable of interest is the Gini index of wealth concentration. The Gini is a simple way to compare wealth inequality across countries but it masks important changes in certain groups of the wealth distribution. This is why I also look at the wealth share of the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% of the distribution. All wealth series are based on the concept of “net personal wealth”, which is defined as the sum of financial and non-financial assets net of financial liabilities held by the household sector. I take the data exactly as published in the WID.

The annual variation in wealth inequality for an average country is close to zero. Given that wealth moves rather slowly over time, the outcome values refer to at least five years ( $T_0 + 5$ ) after the adoption of MaPP ( $T_0$ ). This ensures just enough variability on wealth to produce meaningful results.<sup>5</sup> The fact that the distribution of wealth changes slowly over time is particularly suitable for synthetic controls since small interventions like an LTV or DSTI ratio may be indistinguishable from all other shocks when the outcome of interest is very volatile (Abadie, 2021).

I assign to the treatment group every country that implements MaPP during the sample period. I obtain these data from Alam et al. (2019). The treated countries remain in the treatment group as long as they maintain a tight macroprudential stance, i.e., the cumulative number of MaPP tools remains positive in the sample period. All the countries that do not implement MaPP are assigned to the control group. In line with previous studies, I focus on borrower-based policies that have strong redistributive effects. This includes the DSTI and the LTV ratios (e.g., Lim et al., 2011; Frost and Stralen, 2018; Teixeira and Venter, 2023). Both ratios place explicit limits on debt and restrict the ability of individuals with little collateral to purchase a house or invest in a small business. These individuals have fewer chances to increase their wealth, benefit from a rise in asset prices or have a cushion for bad times.

<sup>5</sup> To ensure enough variability in the outcome variable, it is common to look at the variable a few years after treatment. For example, Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) examine the effects of economic liberalization on GDP growth five years after the liberalization episode occurred.

**Table 1**  
Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min	25th Pctl.	Median	75th Pctl.	Max
Treatment	4,446	0.171	0.376	0	0	0	0	1
Average Education	3,004	0.755	0.328	0.053	0.472	0.843	0.995	1.640
Financial Development	4,290	0.269	0.234	0	0.096	0.185	0.401	1
Forward Guidance	4,446	0.059	0.236	0	0	0	0	1
Gini Index, Wealth	3,863	0.766	0.068	0.472	0.722	0.75	0.807	1
Gov. Expenditure on Education	3,332	4.287	1.827	0	2.92	4.096	5.324	14.059
Gov. Subsidies	2,874	37.761	19.603	0	22.605	35.392	52.065	90.028
Inflation	4,076	0.103	0.828	-0.181	0.018	0.039	0.079	4.145
Population Growth	4,238	0.016	0.020	-0.044	0.005	0.014	0.025	0.191
Real GDP per capita	3,962	10,686	1,402	456	1,313	4,133	12,864	46,273
Total Population	4,368	39,059	14,1	0,075	3,083	8,917	26,233	1411
Wealth Bottom 50%	4,008	0.042	0.025	-0.053	0.028	0.048	0.058	0.166
Wealth Top 1%	4,008	0.299	0.082	0.121	0.241	0.278	0.348	0.571
Wealth Top 10%	4,008	0.629	0.079	0.392	0.574	0.609	0.677	0.891

Note: The table presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. “Treatment” is a dummy variable set to one when a country implements an LTV or DSTI ratio. “Average Education” is the gross school enrollment ratio calculated as the number of students enrolled in secondary school, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education. “Financial Development” is the index of financial development proposed by Svirydenka (2016). “Forward Guidance” is a dummy variable that equals one when the central bank of a country uses forward guidance in a given year (Sutherland, 2022). “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration, where wealth is defined as personal non-financial assets plus personal financial assets minus personal debt. “Gov. Expenditure on Education” is the general government expenditure on education (current, capital, and transfers) as a percentage of GDP. “Gov. Subsidies” is the government expenditure on subsidies, grants, and other social benefits as a percentage of expenses. “Inflation” is the annual growth rate in the consumer price index calculated using the Laspeyres formula. “Population Growth” is the growth rate in the number of residents in a country regardless of their legal status or citizenship. “Real GDP per capita” is gross domestic product divided by midyear population (in thousands, constant 2015 U.S. dollars). “Total Population” is the *de facto* definition of population (in millions). “Wealth Top 1%, Top 10% and Bottom 50%” are the net personal wealth shares held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country, respectively.


**Table 2**  
Impact of MaPP on Wealth Inequality Per Country Income Level.

	Period	Gini Index	Wealth		
			Top 1%	Top 10%	Bottom 50%
Panel A: Full Sample	$T_0 + 5$	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.002† (0.001)	0.000† (0.000)
	$T_0 + 6$	0.004* (0.001)	0.004* (0.001)	0.006* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.000)
	$T_0 + 7$	0.009* (0.002)	0.010* (0.002)	0.012* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.001)
	$T_0 + 8$	0.017* (0.002)	0.022* (0.003)	0.022* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.001)
	$T_0 + 9$	0.028* (0.003)	0.037* (0.004)	0.036* (0.003)	-0.009* (0.001)
	$T_0 + 10$	0.034* (0.003)	0.051* (0.004)	0.045* (0.003)	-0.010* (0.002)
	Panel B: Advanced Economies	$T_0 + 5$	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
$T_0 + 6$		0.003* (0.001)	0.002† (0.001)	0.004* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.000)
$T_0 + 7$		0.011* (0.002)	0.013* (0.002)	0.011* (0.002)	-0.005* (0.001)
$T_0 + 8$		0.019* (0.002)	0.025* (0.003)	0.021* (0.002)	-0.007* (0.001)
$T_0 + 9$		0.025* (0.003)	0.035* (0.004)	0.028* (0.003)	-0.008* (0.001)
$T_0 + 10$		0.029* (0.004)	0.047* (0.004)	0.039* (0.003)	-0.009* (0.001)
Panel C: Emerging Economies		$T_0 + 5$	0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002† (0.001)
	$T_0 + 6$	0.004* (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006* (0.002)	-0.008† (0.001)
	$T_0 + 7$	0.008* (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)	0.011* (0.004)	-0.002† (0.001)
	$T_0 + 8$	0.013* (0.005)	0.015* (0.005)	0.018* (0.005)	-0.002* (0.002)
	$T_0 + 9$	0.018* (0.006)	0.020* (0.007)	0.024* (0.006)	-0.002† (0.002)
	$T_0 + 10$	0.021* (0.007)	0.021* (0.001)	0.027* (0.008)	-0.002† (0.003)

Note: The table presents the cumulative average treatment effects of MaPP on the treated countries (ATT) for each post-treatment period up to ten years after MaPP adoption. Panel A shows the cumulative ATT estimates for the full sample (baseline results). Panel B and C display the cumulative ATT estimates for advanced and emerging economies, respectively. “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration. “Wealth” is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level and are reported in parentheses.

\*Represent statistical significance at the 1% level.

†Represent statistical significance at the 5% level.



**Fig. 1.** Trends in wealth inequality, baseline results.

*Note:* The figure shows the average treatment effect of MaPP on the treated countries (ATT). “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration. “Wealth” is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. The outcome values refer to five years ( $T_0 + 5$ ) after the treatment year ( $T_0$ ). The estimated values based on the synthetic controls are computed using a two-way fixed effects model that accounts for unobserved country-specific and time-specific confounders. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level. The covariates include average education, financial development, inflation, population, and real GDP per capita. The optimal number of factors is selected using cross-validation to minimize the MSPE. [Appendix A](#) provides the list of countries and relative weights included in each synthetic control for each treated country.

The set of conditioning factors includes important characteristics of countries that are closely related to wealth inequality. Following the literature, I look at average education, financial development, inflation, population, and real GDP per capita (e.g., [Hasan et al., 2020](#)).<sup>6</sup> This choice of conditioning factors ensures that the synthetic controls can reproduce almost exactly the characteristics of the countries with MaPP. The visual evidence provided in this paper confirms that the synthetic controls are very similar to the treated countries during the pre-treatment period ([Abadie, 2021](#)).<sup>7</sup> The data for the conditioning factors is taken from the World Bank Open Data Catalogue. The tables’ footnotes provide a more detailed description of the factors.

<sup>6</sup> I exclude the policy rate because data is missing for a large number of countries. Instead, I use inflation as a close substitute. Moreover, I exclude the tax rate since taxes vary very little per country. Excluding these factors improves the precision of the ATT estimates. The reader should be assured, however, that the results are substantively identical when these factors are included in the models.

<sup>7</sup> One may argue that I should also account for factors that directly affect the distribution of wealth. To provide robustness checks, I repeat the analysis using conditioning factors that are more likely to be related to the distribution of wealth rather than the level of wealth. These results are discussed in [Section 4.2](#).

Each model uses a cross-validation procedure to choose the optimal number of factors that minimizes the MSPE of the wealth outcome. To improve pre-treatment matching, I restrict the analysis to countries with at least 7 pre-treatment periods ([Xu, 2017](#)). All countries with data missing in the post-treatment period are also removed. This reduces the final sample to 114 countries but ensures that the response of wealth inequality to unobserved factors will be fairly similar between treated countries and synthetic controls ([Abadie et al., 2010](#)).

[Table 1](#) reports summary statistics for the full sample. There are 34 treated countries. The donor pool includes the remaining 80 countries.<sup>8</sup> The distribution of wealth differs drastically by country’s income level. Later on, I explore how the results change when I divide the sample into advanced and emerging economies.

## 4. Results

### 4.1. Baseline results

[Fig. 1](#) plots the evolution of wealth inequality in countries with MaPP and their synthetic controls. As the figure makes apparent, the synthetic controls closely reproduce the trajectories of wealth in the

<sup>8</sup> For more detail on the sample, see [Appendix A](#).




Fig. 2. Trends in wealth inequality, DSTI ratio.

Note: The figure shows the average treatment effect of MaPP on countries that implement a DSTI ratio (ATT). “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration. “Wealth” is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. The outcome values refer to five years ( $T_0 + 5$ ) after the treatment year ( $T_0$ ). The estimated values based on the synthetic controls are computed using a two-way fixed effects model that accounts for unobserved country-specific and time-specific confounders. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level. The covariates include average education, financial development, inflation, population, and real GDP per capita. The optimal number of factors is selected using cross-validation to minimize the MSPE. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level.

treated countries prior to the adoption of MaPP. This close fit demonstrates that the synthetic controls are a suitable comparison group to examine the effects of MaPP on wealth inequality in the treated countries.

The estimate of the effects of MaPP is given by the difference between the observed wealth outcome in the treated countries and their synthetic controls. In the initial period, immediately after countries implement MaPP, the Gini index of wealth concentration remains relatively stable.<sup>9</sup> From  $T_0 + 7$  onwards, the Gini of the treated countries and their synthetic controls begin to diverge noticeably. While the Gini in the synthetic controls displays a moderate downward trend, the Gini of the treated countries rises steadily. A decade after MaPP adoption, the Gini of the treated countries is estimated to be 3.4 percentage points above that of the synthetic controls. This discrepancy in the Gini trajectories suggests that MaPP has strong effects on wealth concentration.

This finding raises a natural question. Does MaPP affect everyone in the same way? The answer is, obviously, no. The baseline estimates

<sup>9</sup> This is expected given the stability of wealth over time. There is also plenty of evidence that MaPP only affects households a few years later after they have had enough time to adjust their behavior (e.g., Borio and Shim, 2007; Richter et al., 2019; Teixeira and Venter, 2023).

indicate that MaPP expands the wealth share of the top 1% by 5.1 percentage points relative to a synthetic control country during the post-treatment period. The estimates for the wealth share of the top 10% are roughly in the same ballpark. Conversely, the wealth share of the bottom 50% declines by 1 percentage point in the same period. Although this value appears to be small, it implies that the average wealth of the bottom 50% decreases by about one-third in a decade. These results are consistent with the view that MaPP is more likely to affect people with intermediate levels of wealth. This is a painfully obvious point that has somehow been overlooked by the literature.

To evaluate the robustness of these estimates, I compute standard errors for each ATT using the parametric bootstrap procedure explained earlier. Panel A of Table 2 reports cumulative ATTs of MaPP for the full sample and their respective standard errors. It can be clearly seen that almost every estimated ATT is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the effects of MaPP are unusually large in the treated countries relative to the distribution of the estimates for the synthetic controls.

A potential concern with the analysis above is that some unobserved factors may be driving the wealth outcomes after the adoption of MaPP. Notwithstanding the importance of this criticism, it is unlikely that an unobserved factor would fully explain the differences in wealth inequality between treated countries and synthetic controls. The reason is that I restrict the analysis to treated countries with at least 7 pre-treatment periods. By doing so, I ensure that the response of wealth




Fig. 3. Trends in wealth inequality, LTV Ratio.

Note: The figure shows the average treatment effect of MaPP on countries that implement an LTV ratio (ATT). “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration. “Wealth” is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. The outcome values refer to five years ( $T_0 + 5$ ) after the treatment year ( $T_0$ ). The estimated values based on the synthetic controls are computed using a two-way fixed effects model that accounts for unobserved country-specific and time-specific confounders. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level. The covariates include average education, financial development, inflation, population, and real GDP per capita. The optimal number of factors is selected using cross-validation to minimize the MSPE.

inequality to unobserved factors will not differ drastically between treated countries and synthetic controls in the post-treatment period (Abadie et al., 2010). It is also worth noting that the only way that synthetic controls are able to reproduce the trajectories of wealth over extended periods of time is if the control units are comparable to the countries with MaPP both in terms of observed and unobserved factors as well as in the effects of those factors on wealth (Abadie et al., 2015). Therefore, the impact of an unobserved factor would have to be quite large to change the results substantively. This possibility is explored in the next section.

Having said this, I wish to emphasize that my estimates are in line with those obtained by Delis et al. (2014) and Frost and Stralen (2018) for income inequality using regression methods. Delis et al. (2014) suggest that bank regulation increases income concentration by approximately 5 percentage points. Like me, they also find that bank regulation decreases the income share of the bottom 10% with little impact on the income share of the top 10%. Recently, Frost and Stralen (2018) reports that MaPP adoption is associated with an increase of 3 percentage points in income concentration. The results from my analysis point to a similarly large impact on wealth concentration, which suggests that the effects of MaPP on inequality are more persistent and severe than previously thought.

Overall, these findings support the view that MaPP exacerbates wealth inequality. After the adoption of MaPP, the rich and, for that

matter, the upper middle class, become a great deal richer, while the poor become significantly poorer. In the next section, I explore the robustness of these results using alternative model specifications.

#### 4.2. Robustness checks

This section further explores the robustness of the relationship between MaPP and wealth inequality. I first check if the results are robust to changes in the set of conditioning factors. As mentioned in an earlier footnote, some conditioning factors may be related to the level of wealth but not necessarily to the distribution of wealth. This could affect the estimation of the factor loadings and the construction of synthetic controls. It may be argued, for example, that average education is intrinsically related to the level of wealth but not to the distribution of wealth. For instance, many advanced economies have both high levels of education and wealth inequality. A similar case can be made for population, which may or may not be related to the distribution of wealth in a country.

To account for these possibilities, I repeat the analysis using alternative measures of education and population. More specifically, I examine whether the results change when the estimation is performed using government expenditure on education and population growth. Admittedly, these factors are more likely to be related to changes in




Fig. 4. Trends in wealth inequality, advanced economies.

Note: The figure shows the average treatment effect of MaPP on treated advanced economies (ATT). “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration. “Wealth” is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. The outcome values refer to five years ( $T_0 + 5$ ) after the treatment year ( $T_0$ ). The estimated values based on the synthetic controls are computed using a two-way fixed effects model that accounts for unobserved country-specific and time-specific confounders. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level. The covariates include average education, financial development, inflation, population, and real GDP per capita. The optimal number of factors is selected using cross-validation to minimize the MSPE.

the distribution of wealth rather than in the level of wealth. The results from these robustness tests are reported in Appendix B.

Fig. B.1 shows that MaPP still leads to a substantial rise in wealth inequality when I use alternative conditioning factors. The pattern of wealth inequality is very similar to the baseline case: there is an increase in the wealth share of the top 1% combined with a decrease in the wealth share of the bottom 50%. The results do not change much because the estimated effects of MaPP on wealth inequality do not depend, at least directly, on the choice of conditioning factors. A more interesting question is how the magnitude of the impact of MaPP is influenced by the choice of conditioning factors. The results reveal that MaPP increases wealth inequality by 5.4 percentage points in a decade. These estimates are slightly higher than those found in the previous section and suggest that the baseline results should be taken as a conservative estimate of the true effects of MaPP.

I also test the robustness of the results to other possible factors driving wealth inequality after the adoption of MaPP. These factors include relevant changes in fiscal policy or unconventional monetary policy.<sup>10</sup> As shown in Figs. B.2 and B.3 the results hardly change. After I explicitly control for fiscal policy, wealth concentration as measured

by the Gini index increases by 3.2 percentage points in a decade. This compares to 3.4 percentage points in the baseline case. This small difference suggests that fiscal policy does not strongly influence the impact of MaPP on wealth inequality. Likewise, when I control for unconventional monetary policy, wealth inequality rises 3.8 percentage points. This is only 0.4 percentage points above the baseline case. A possible explanation for this result is that forward guidance enhances the effects of MaPP when agents anticipate that credit will remain tight in the future.

In summary, the results from these different robustness tests are quite close to the baseline case. The adoption of MaPP always leads to an increase in wealth inequality. This increase ranges from 3.2 to 5.4 percentage points in a decade. Importantly, these results suggest that most of the variation in the effects of MaPP is due to differences in the distribution of wealth across countries and not so much due to omitted variable bias. As we shall see next, the effects of MaPP also vary with the design of the policy tool and the country’s income level.

<sup>10</sup> I use government subsidies as a proxy for fiscal policy and forward guidance as a proxy for unconventional monetary policy. The data on government

subsidies is readily available on the World Bank Open Data Catalogue, while the data on forward guidance comes from Sutherland (2022) who analyses thirty years of monetary policy statements in eight major central banks.






Fig. 5. Trends in wealth inequality, emerging economies.

Note: The figure shows the average treatment effect of MaPP on treated emerging economies (ATT). “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration. “Wealth” is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. The outcome values refer to five years ( $T_0 + 5$ ) after the treatment year ( $T_0$ ). The estimated values based on the synthetic controls are computed using a two-way fixed effects model that accounts for unobserved country-specific and time-specific confounders. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level. The covariates include average education, financial development, inflation, population, and real GDP per capita. The optimal number of factors is selected using cross-validation to minimize the MSPE.

## 5. Extensions

In this section, I investigate whether the effects of MaPP vary with the policy tool and the country’s income level. The DSTI ratio restricts credit based on income, while the LTV ratio limits credit based on collateral. These tools may have disparate effects on wealth inequality. Similarly, the response of wealth may vary appreciably across countries with different income levels. I investigate these issues separately below.

### 5.1. Policy tools

This section separates the effects of the DSTI ratio from the effects of the LTV ratio. I face two challenges here. The first is that some countries implement LTV and DSTI ratios, simultaneously. A way to address this is to divide the sample into countries that implement either one of these tools. The drawback is that I end up dropping all countries that implement both tools at the same time. The second challenge is that most countries only implement a DSTI ratio after the Great Recession. As a result, there are only a few observations available for the DSTI ratio in the post-treatment period. To get around this, I compare the ATTs of both tools from  $T_0 + 5$  to  $T_0 + 8$ . This time span ensures that the synthetic controls have a similar amount of data available for both tools.

Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for both policy tools. Fig. 2 displays the evolution of wealth inequality in countries with DSTI ratios and their synthetic versions. As the figure suggests, the synthetic controls can reproduce the evolution of wealth inequality in the treated countries during the pre-treatment period. The estimates indicate that the adoption of a DSTI ratio increases the Gini index of wealth concentration by 5.7 percentage points in a decade. The cumulative ATTs for the top 1%, top 10%, and bottom 50% are 4.7, 6.4 and  $-1.9$  percentage points, respectively. What is most interesting is that the rise in the wealth share of the top 1% pales in comparison to the one of the top 10%. This suggests that the DSTI ratio benefits mostly the upper middle class at the expense of the lower middle class and the bottom 50%. These results confirm that prudential rules based on income affect mostly individuals with intermediate levels of wealth.

The estimates for the LTV ratio, shown in Fig. 3, are much weaker. Once again, the synthetic controls are able to replicate the trajectories of wealth in the pre-MaPP years. Surprisingly, the effects of the LTV ratio on wealth inequality are relatively mild. The results indicate that the Gini index of wealth concentration increases a modest 1.1 percentage points in a decade. Just to be sure, these effects are six times smaller than the ones found for the DSTI ratio. Still, the LTV ratio, much like the DSTI ratio, increases the wealth share of the upper middle class and the rich by approximately 3 percentage points. This is in contrast

**Table 3**  
Impact of MaPP on Wealth Inequality Per Policy Tool.

	Period	Gini Index	Wealth			
			Top 1%	Top 10%	Bottom 50%	
Panel A: DSTI	$T_0 + 5$	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.000)	
		0.006* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.000)	
	$T_0 + 6$	0.018* (0.003)	0.012* (0.003)	0.018* (0.004)	-0.006* (0.001)	
		0.032* (0.004)	0.021* (0.004)	0.033* (0.005)	-0.011* (0.002)	
	$T_0 + 7$	0.044* (0.005)	0.034* (0.005)	0.048* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.003)	
		0.057* (0.006)	0.047* (0.006)	0.064* (0.008)	-0.019* (0.003)	
	Panel B: LTV	$T_0 + 5$	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
			-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
		$T_0 + 6$	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.000)
			-0.001 (0.002)	0.009* (0.003)	0.010* (0.002)	0.003† (0.001)
$T_0 + 7$		0.007* (0.003)	0.022* (0.04)	0.022* (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	
		0.011* (0.003)	0.033* (0.005)	0.031* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	

Note: The table presents the cumulative average treatment effects of MaPP on the treated countries (ATT) for each post-treatment period up to ten years after MaPP adoption. Panel A shows the cumulative ATT estimates for the DSTI ratio. Panel B displays the cumulative ATT estimates for the LTV ratio. "Gini Index, Wealth" is the Gini index of wealth concentration. "Wealth" is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level and are reported in parentheses.

\*Represent statistical significance at the 1% level.

†Represent statistical significance at the 5% level.

with the wealth share of the bottom 50%, which decreases by 0.1 percentage points. The combined evidence of these figures suggests that the lower middle class is the most affected by LTV ratios. These results could vary with the intensity of the LTV and DSTI ratio. Although I do not explicitly control for this, the effects of the LTV ratio are clearly small.

On the whole, these results indicate that prudential rules based on income have pernicious effects on the distribution of wealth. If central banks are concerned about the redistributive effects of MaPP, as they should be, they must opt for policies that establish higher collateral requirements rather than restricting credit based on income.

## 5.2. Country income level

As a final exercise, I examine whether the effects of MaPP vary with the country's income level. There is much evidence that inequality is inversely related to growth in emerging economies and directly related to growth in advanced economies (Barro, 2000). It is only reasonable to expect MaPP to have different effects on advanced and emerging economies. To investigate this, I divide the sample into advanced and emerging economies based on the World Bank's country classification by income level.<sup>11</sup>

Fig. 4 plots the trends in wealth inequality for treated advanced economies as well as their synthetic counterparts. Despite the smaller donor pool, the synthetic controls are still able to replicate the evolution of wealth inequality in the treated countries during the pre-treatment period. Broadly speaking, I find that MaPP aggravates wealth

<sup>11</sup> The advanced economies comprise upper-middle and high-income countries, while the emerging economies include lower-middle and low-income countries. This is a simple and tractable way to examine how the effects of MaPP change with the country's income level.

inequality in advanced economies. After a decade of MaPP, the Gini index of wealth concentration in the treated countries is estimated to be 2.9 percentage points above that of the synthetic controls. During the same period, the wealth share of the top 1% expands by 4.7 percentage points, while that of the bottom 50% shrinks by 0.9 percentage points. These effects are fairly large and persistent.

Turning next to emerging economies, Fig. 5 shows that the effects of MaPP on wealth inequality are much smaller. To facilitate the comparison, Panels B and C of Table 2 disaggregate the estimated effects of MaPP per country income level. The Gini index of wealth concentration increases by 2.1 percentage points above that of the synthetic controls in the post-treatment period. This is about one-third less than the estimate for advanced economies. The wealth share of the top 1% and top 10% increases by 2.1 and 2.7 percentage points in a decade, while the wealth share of the bottom 50% decreases a meager 0.2 percentage points. Once again, people with intermediate levels of wealth seem to be most affected by MaPP. These effects are nonetheless small and temporary.

One might ask why the effects of MaPP are more pronounced in advanced economies. Here I will necessarily leave solid ground. A plausible explanation, consistent with the evidence in this paper, is that advanced economies have more people with intermediate levels of wealth. Another possible explanation is that people in emerging economies are more likely to use informal credit and should be less affected by MaPP (Teixeira, 2022). It is not too surprising, then, that MaPP has more serious effects on the wealth distribution of advanced economies.

The bottom line is that MaPP increases the wealth share of the relatively rich and makes it more difficult for the poor to climb the wealth ladder. This is true for all countries regardless of their stage of development. Nevertheless, these effects are much stronger on advanced economies. I conclude with a few policy implications.

## 6. Conclusions

There is a widespread belief that MaPP is necessary to prevent financial crises. Surely, MaPP helps maintain financial stability. But at what cost and to whom? This paper provides evidence of a negative impact of MaPP on wealth inequality. I find that MaPP increases wealth concentration by approximately 3.4 percentage points in a decade. This increase in inequality is explained by an ever-growing share of wealth going to the top of the distribution. As wealth becomes more and more concentrated, the middle class and the relatively poor get trapped in a cycle of less credit and rising prices. This makes it harder for them to accumulate wealth over time. These effects are generally stronger for DSTI ratios, which suggests that prudential rules based on income have stronger redistributive effects. The effects of MaPP are also more pronounced on advanced economies possibly because MaPP restricts credit to a large number of people with intermediate levels of wealth.

This analysis can be extended in several directions. First, the GSC model does not accommodate treatment reversal. As a consequence, I cannot fully account for the effects of loosening, tightening, or removing MaPP. An important question that remains unanswered is how the strength of the macroprudential stance affects inequality. Second, it would be interesting to separate the effects of MaPP from all other possible factors driving wealth inequality after the adoption of MaPP. The results presented here are robust to changes in fiscal policy and unconventional monetary policy but more work is needed on the way these policies interact with MaPP. Lastly, I assume that all treated countries implement similar prudential rules but this is not necessarily the case. Future work could explore how the limits of the DSTI and LTV ratios affect wealth inequality.

Despite these shortcomings, the core message that follows from this paper is that MaPP improves financial stability at the cost of greater wealth inequality. Does this mean, then, that we should never adopt MaPP? No, of course not. It just means that we should carefully consider the interaction between MaPP and the interest rate. Failing to do so may exacerbate wealth inequality.

**Data availability**

I have shared a list with the control units for every synthetic control. The full dataset is available upon request.

**Appendix A. Sample details***A.1. Sample*

Country	Treatment Status
Afghanistan	Missing Data
Albania	Control Unit
Algeria	Treated since 2007
Angola	Control Unit
Argentina	Missing Data
Armenia	Control Unit
Australia	Missing Data
Austria	Control Unit
Azerbaijan	Missing Data
Bahamas	Missing Data
Bahrain	Treated since 2012
Bangladesh	Missing Data
Belarus	Control Unit
Belgium	Control Unit
Belize	Missing Data
Benin	Control Unit
Bhutan	Treated since 2014
Bolivia	Control Unit
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Missing Data
Botswana	Control Unit
Brazil	Treated since 2013
Bulgaria	Control Unit
Burkina Faso	Control Unit
Burundi	Control Unit
Cabo Verde	Control Unit
Cambodia	Control Unit
Cameroon	Control Unit
Canada	Treated since 2012
Central African Republic	Control Unit
Chad	Control Unit
Chile	Control Unit
China	Missing Data
Colombia	Missing Data
Comoros	Missing Data
Congo	Missing Data
Costa Rica	Treated since 2005
Cote d'Ivoire	Control Unit
Croatia	Treated since 2006
Cuba	Missing Data
Cyprus	Treated since 2003
Czech Republic	Treated since 2015
Denmark	Missing Data
Djibouti	Missing Data
Dominican Republic	Control Unit
DR Congo	Missing Data
Ecuador	Missing Data
Egypt	Missing Data
El Salvador	Control Unit
Equatorial Guinea	Control Unit
Eritrea	Missing Data
Estonia	Treated since 2015
Ethiopia	Control Unit

Country	Treatment Status
Finland	Treated since 2010
France	Control Unit
Gabon	Missing Data
Gambia	Missing Data
Georgia	Control Unit
Germany	Control Unit
Ghana	Control Unit
Greece	Treated since 2005
Guatemala	Control Unit
Guinea	Control Unit
Guinea-Bissau	Control Unit
Guyana	Control Unit
Haiti	Missing Data
Honduras	Control Unit
Hungary	Treated since 2010
Iceland	Control Unit
India	Treated since 2010
Indonesia	Treated since 2012
Iran	Missing Data
Iraq	Control Unit
Ireland	Missing Data
Israel	Treated since 2012
Italy	Control Unit
Jamaica	Control Unit
Japan	Missing Data
Jordan	Treated since 2008
Kazakhstan	Treated since 2013
Kenya	Control Unit
Korea	Missing Data
Kuwait	Missing Data
Kyrgyzstan	Missing Data
Lao PDR	Control Unit
Latvia	Treated since 2007
Lebanon	Missing Data
Lesotho	Control Unit
Liberia	Missing Data
Libya	Missing Data
Lithuania	Treated since 2011
Luxembourg	Missing Data
Macao	Missing Data
Madagascar	Control Unit
Malawi	Control Unit
Maldives	Control Unit
Mali	Control Unit
Malta	Control Unit
Mauritania	Control Unit
Mauritius	Treated since 2014
Mexico	Control Unit
Moldova	Missing Data
Mongolia	Treated since 2008
Montenegro	Missing Data
Morocco	Control Unit
Mozambique	Control Unit
Myanmar	Control Unit
Namibia	Missing Data
Nepal	Treated since 2009
Netherlands	Treated since 2007
New Zealand	Treated since 2013
Nicaragua	Control Unit
Niger	Control Unit
Nigeria	Control Unit
North Macedonia	Control Unit
Norway	Treated since 2010
Oman	Missing Data
Pakistan	Missing Data

Country	Treatment Status
Palestine	Missing Data
Panama	Control Unit
Papua New Guinea	Control Unit
Paraguay	Control Unit
Peru	Control Unit
Philippines	Control Unit
Poland	Treated since 2010
Portugal	Missing Data
Qatar	Control Unit
Romania	Treated since 2004
Russian Federation	Control Unit
Rwanda	Control Unit
Sao Tome and Principe	Control Unit
Saudi Arabia	Treated since 2014
Senegal	Control Unit
Serbia	Missing Data
Seychelles	Control Unit
Sierra Leone	Control Unit
Singapore	Missing Data
Slovakia	Missing Data
Slovenia	Control Unit
Somalia	Missing Data
South Africa	Control Unit
South Sudan	Control Unit
Spain	Control Unit
Sri Lanka	Treated since 2015
Sudan	Control Unit
Suriname	Control Unit
Swaziland	Missing Data
Sweden	Treated since 2004
Switzerland	Control Unit
Syrian Arab Republic	Control Unit
Taiwan	Missing Data
Tajikistan	Control Unit
Tanzania	Missing Data
Thailand	Missing Data
Timor-Leste	Control Unit
Togo	Control Unit
Trinidad and Tobago	Control Unit
Tunisia	Control Unit
Turkey	Treated since 2011
Turkmenistan	Missing Data
Uganda	Missing Data
Ukraine	Control Unit
United Arab Emirates	Treated since 2011
United Kingdom	Treated since 2014
Uruguay	Control Unit
USA	Missing Data
Uzbekistan	Missing Data
Venezuela	Missing Data
Vietnam	Missing Data
Yemen	Missing Data
Zambia	Missing Data
Zimbabwe	Missing Data

Note: The table reports the treatment status of each country in the sample. “Treated countries” implement either LTV or DSTI ratios during the sample period. “Control unit” is a country that does not implement MaPP during the sample period. “Missing data” refers to countries that have at least one factor with less than 7 observations in the pre-treatment period or data missing in the post-treatment period. These countries are removed from the analysis to reduce bias in the causal estimates.

Table A2.1

List of Country Codes.

Treated units		Control units	
ID	Name	ID	Name
AE	United Arab Emirates	AL	Albania
BH	Bahrain	AM	Armenia
BR	Brazil	AO	Angola
BT	Bhutan	AT	Austria
CA	Canada	BE	Belgium
CR	Costa Rica	BF	Burkina Faso
CY	Cyprus	BG	Bulgaria
CZ	Czech Republic	BI	Burundi
DZ	Algeria	BJ	Benin
EE	Estonia	BO	Bolivia
FI	Finland	BW	Botswana
GB	United Kingdom	BY	Belarus
GR	Greece	CF	Central African Republic
HR	Croatia	CH	Switzerland
HU	Hungary	CI	Cote d'Ivoire
ID	Indonesia	CL	Chile
IL	Israel	CM	Cameroon
IN	India	CV	Cabo Verde
JO	Jordan	DE	Germany
KZ	Kazakhstan	DO	Dominican Republic
LK	Sri Lanka	ES	Spain
LT	Lithuania	ET	Ethiopia
LV	Latvia	FR	France
MN	Mongolia	GE	Georgia
MU	Mauritius	GH	Ghana
NL	Netherlands	GN	Guinea
NO	Norway	GQ	Equatorial Guinea
NP	Nepal	GT	Guatemala
NZ	New Zealand	GW	Guinea-Bissau
PL	Poland	GY	Guyana
RO	Romania	HN	Honduras
SA	Saudi Arabia	IQ	Iraq
SE	Sweden	IS	Iceland
TR	Turkey	IT	Italy
		JM	Jamaica
		KE	Kenya
		KH	Cambodia
		LA	Lao PDR
		LS	Lesotho
		MA	Morocco
		MG	Madagascar
		MK	North Macedonia
		ML	Mali
		MM	Myanmar
		MR	Mauritania
		MT	Malta
		MV	Maldives
		MW	Malawi
		MX	Mexico
		MZ	Mozambique
		NE	Niger
		NG	Nigeria
		NI	Nicaragua
		PA	Panama
		PE	Peru
		PG	Papua New Guinea
		PH	Philippines
		PY	Paraguay
		QA	Qatar
		QT	South Africa
		RU	Russian Federation
		RW	Rwanda
		SC	Seychelles
		SD	Sudan
		SI	Slovenia
		SL	Sierra Leone
		SN	Senegal
		SR	Suriname
		SS	South Sudan
		ST	Sao Tome and Principe
		SV	El Salvador
		SY	Syrian Arab Republic

Table A2.1 (continued).

Treated units		Control units	
ID	Name	ID	Name
		TD	Chad
		TG	Togo
		TJ	Tajikistan
		TL	Timor-Leste
		TN	Tunisia
		TT	Trinidad and Tobago
		UA	Ukraine
		UY	Uruguay

A.2. List of synthetic controls

This appendix reports the implicit weights of every control unit for each synthetic control in the baseline analysis. A few things to notice. First, the weights take into account the similarity of the factors but also the outcome of interest. This means that the weights vary with the wealth outcome. Second, contrary to standard synthetic controls, the loadings (or “weights”) can be positive or negative and they are not restricted to be in [0,1]. A list of country codes is presented in Table A2.1 along with the synthetic controls in Figs. A2.1–A2.4.

UNTREATED COUNTRIES (ROWS) / TREATED COUNTRIES (COLUMNS)	WEIGHTS																																	
	AE	BH	BR	BT	CA	CR	CY	CZ	DZ	FI	GB	GR	HR	HU	ID	IL	IN	JO	KZ	LK	LT	LV	MN	MU	NL	NO	NP	NZ	PL	RO	SA	SE	TR	
AL	-0.04	-0.04	0.07	0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.19	0.01	0.09	0.15	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.08	-0.04	0.02	-0.01	-0.05	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.08	0.03	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.09	-0.03	
AM	0.04	0.04	-0.06	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.04	-0.17	0.00	-0.05	-0.12	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.05	-0.09	0.01	-0.06	-0.11	-0.02	-0.10	-0.05	-0.02	
AO	-0.34	-0.21	0.46	0.33	-0.08	0.02	-0.10	0.92	0.08	0.36	0.97	0.06	0.14	0.01	0.45	-0.35	0.27	-0.07	-0.33	0.52	0.15	0.08	0.02	-0.17	-0.41	0.05	0.05	0.40	0.04	0.05	0.45	0.46	0.36	
AT	0.09	0.05	-0.02	0.01	0.04	0.02	-0.03	-0.29	-0.01	-0.03	-0.28	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	-0.16	0.20	-0.08	0.03	0.05	-0.02	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.01	-0.01	-0.11	-0.01	-0.11	-0.01	-0.11	-0.08	0.06
BE	-0.06	-0.08	0.13	-0.02	-0.05	-0.03	0.12	0.37	0.00	0.09	0.24	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.08	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	-0.07	-0.16	0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.15	-0.09	0.20	-0.02	0.12	0.03	0.05	0.20	0.10	-0.02	
BF	0.27	0.52	-0.99	-0.14	0.22	0.02	-0.43	-2.21	-0.11	-0.89	-1.50	-0.14	-0.24	-0.13	-0.80	-0.02	-0.18	0.16	0.53	0.34	-0.22	-0.04	-0.14	0.55	0.84	-0.70	0.06	-0.82	-0.27	0.48	-1.09	-0.87	0.67	
BG	-0.11	-0.09	0.12	0.05	-0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.40	0.02	0.19	0.31	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.16	-0.11	-0.03	-0.04	-0.11	0.08	0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.14	-0.17	0.10	0.00	0.14	0.04	0.05	0.20	0.17	-0.06	
BI	-0.09	-0.05	0.09	0.05	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.25	0.01	0.06	0.26	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.12	-0.12	0.06	-0.02	-0.07	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.06	-0.08	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.10	0.08	
BJ	-0.42	-0.27	0.20	-0.11	-0.22	-0.16	0.34	1.50	-0.02	-0.02	1.36	0.17	0.07	-0.03	0.63	-0.88	0.25	-0.19	-0.21	-0.39	0.08	-0.08	-0.04	-0.47	-0.21	0.31	0.01	0.54	0.00	0.02	0.68	0.30	0.01	
BO	0.28	0.22	-0.30	-0.06	0.14	0.06	-0.15	-1.07	-0.03	-0.15	-0.97	-0.10	-0.09	0.00	-0.46	0.45	-0.23	0.11	0.22	0.06	-0.09	0.01	0.00	-0.27	0.27	-0.16	-0.01	-0.41	-0.03	-0.07	-0.50	-0.32	-0.04	
BW	-0.01	-0.02	0.08	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.06	-0.03	0.00	-0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.06	0.05	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.00	
BY	0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.07	-0.07	
CF	-0.02	0.23	0.14	-0.42	-0.20	-0.15	0.62	1.22	-0.04	-0.22	0.81	0.11	-0.02	-0.02	0.47	-0.32	0.38	-0.14	0.02	-1.23	0.00	-0.14	0.02	-0.28	-0.01	0.45	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.19	0.49	0.07	0.78	
CH	-0.15	-0.13	0.13	-0.04	-0.09	-0.06	0.16	0.66	0.00	0.05	0.55	0.07	0.04	0.00	0.26	-0.28	0.09	-0.08	-0.10	-0.18	0.04	-0.03	0.00	-0.20	-0.12	0.16	-0.01	0.24	0.02	0.05	0.30	0.15	-0.07	
CI	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.31	0.15	0.14	-0.39	-0.76	0.05	0.33	-0.64	-0.10	0.04	0.05	-0.33	0.51	-0.28	0.11	-0.05	0.77	0.02	0.12	0.03	0.21	-0.11	-0.21	0.03	-0.26	0.02	-0.01	-0.29	0.05	0.30	
CL	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.03	
OM	-0.14	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.27	-0.01	-0.05	0.34	0.04	0.02	-0.02	0.17	-0.35	0.08	-0.04	-0.04	0.06	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.08	-0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.10	-0.03	-0.05	0.11	0.05	0.08	
CV	0.51	0.55	-0.72	0.12	0.36	0.19	-0.68	2.73	-0.03	-0.33	-2.15	-0.25	-0.17	-0.03	-1.04	0.83	-0.40	0.29	0.44	0.87	-0.16	0.10	-0.03	0.77	0.58	-0.76	0.06	-0.98	-0.14	-0.29	-1.27	-0.69	0.43	
DE	0.00	-0.04	0.05	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02	0.10	0.21	0.00	0.06	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.07	-0.17	0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.08	-0.05	0.14	-0.02	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.05	-0.15	
DO	0.28	0.23	-0.29	-0.02	0.14	0.07	-0.19	-1.13	-0.02	-0.16	-0.99	-0.10	-0.09	0.00	-0.48	0.46	-0.21	0.12	0.21	0.13	-0.09	0.02	0.00	0.30	-0.27	-0.20	0.00	-0.42	-0.04	-0.08	-0.52	-0.33	0.04	
EE	0.06	0.05	-0.02	0.06	0.05	0.04	-0.11	-0.29	0.01	0.02	-0.22	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.09	0.14	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.17	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.11	0.02	-0.12	0.01	-0.09	0.00	-0.01	-0.14	-0.03	0.05	
ES	-0.22	-0.01	-0.26	-0.14	-0.09	-0.10	0.08	0.34	-0.05	-0.37	0.53	0.08	-0.03	-0.08	0.25	-0.75	0.23	-0.08	0.05	-0.13	0.01	-0.06	-0.07	-0.11	0.16	-0.12	0.10	-0.12	0.10	-0.16	-0.09	0.09	0.16	
ET	-0.04	-0.05	0.07	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.20	0.02	0.06	0.18	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.11	-0.05	0.08	-0.01	-0.05	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.07	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.08	0.06	-0.06	
FR	-0.09	-0.04	0.02	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	0.09	0.26	-0.02	-0.11	0.27	0.04	-0.01	-0.02	0.09	-0.22	0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.16	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.10	0.03	0.08	0.00	0.10	-0.03	0.04	0.13	0.00	0.14	
GE	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.05	0.12	0.02	0.06	0.17	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.15	-0.13	0.14	0.00	-0.03	0.17	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.04	-0.07	-0.14	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.08	-0.12	
GH	-0.04	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.12	0.02	0.19	0.07	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.01	-0.10	-0.01	-0.07	0.17	0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.06	-0.12	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.11	-0.06	0.06	
GN	-0.04	0.05	-0.03	0.08	0.03	0.00	-0.10	-0.23	-0.02	-0.01	-0.14	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.16	0.01	-0.19	0.01	-0.01	0.18	-0.05	0.00	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.09	-0.05	-0.09	-0.05	0.05	0.39	
GQ	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.07	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.06	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04	-0.18	
GT	0.25	0.20	-0.29	-0.06	0.12	0.05	-0.14	-0.99	-0.03	-0.16	-0.89	-0.09	-0.08	0.00	-0.43	0.40	-0.22	0.10	0.21	0.05	-0.09	0.00	-0.01	0.24	0.26	-0.14	-0.01	-0.38	-0.04	-0.07	-0.46	0.31	0.00	
GW	-0.26	-0.68	1.13	-0.32	-0.44	-0.22	1.11	3.19	0.03	0.18	2.24	0.24	0.12	0.04	1.09	-0.34	0.74	-0.30	-0.40	-0.09	-0.17	0.10	0.54	1.12	-0.16	1.20	0.22	0.52	1.48	0.68	-0.91	0.06		
GY	0.22	0.14	-0.28	-0.12	0.09	0.03	-0.05	-0.69	-0.03	-0.03	-0.72	-0.06	-0.05	0.02	-0.31	0.32	-0.27	0.07	0.16	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01	0.13	0.15	-0.03	-0.02	0.30	0.01	0.00	-0.32	-0.21	-0.28		
HN	0.21	0.14	-0.21	-0.12	0.06	0.01	-0.02	-0.64	-0.03	-0.36	-0.50	-0.06	-0.10	-0.04	-0.22	0.18	0.15	0.07	0.21	-0.22	-0.08	-0.02	-0.01	0.27	0.30	-0.20	-0.01	-0.21	-0.06	-0.07	-0.35	-0.31	0.03	
KJ	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.02	-0.04	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	
KS	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	0.09	0.22	-0.01	0.07	0.11	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.06	-0.06	-0.10	-0.03	-0.02	-0.12	0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.12	0.05	0.15	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.05	-0.15		
IT	-0.07	-0.21	0.61	0.30	-0.04	0.09	-0.05	0.72	0.12	0.42	0.61	0.00	0.13	0.04	0.38	0.21	0.46	0.01	-0.27	0.27	0.16	0.11	0.10	0.07	-0.42	-0.08	0.01	0.36	0.12	0.22	0.32	0.44	-0.10	
JM	0.33	0.28	-0.53	-0.16	0.15	0.06	-0.16	-1.27	-0.04	-0.26	-1.12	-0.10	-0.11	-0.01	-0.47	0.35	-0.21	0.12	0.32	0.06	-0.09	0.00	-0.01	0.34	0.37	-0.28	0.00	-0.50	-0.05	-0.10	-0.64	-0.43	-0.25	
KE	-0.03	-0.04	0.11	0.09	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.13	0.02	0.48	-0.11	0.01	0.07	0.09	-0.08	0.23	-0.50</																	

UNTREATED COUNTRIES (ROWS) / TREATED COUNTRIES (COLUMNS)	AE	BH	BR	BT	CA	CR	CY	CZ	DE	EZ	FI	GB	GR	HR	HU	ID	IL	IN	JO	KZ	LK	LT	LV	MN	MU	NL	NO	NZ	NP	PL	RO	SA	SE	TR	
AL	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.09	0.01	0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.07	0.05	-0.01	
AM	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.03
AO	0.07	0.01	0.33	0.03	-0.11	-0.11	-0.08	0.65	0.03	0.36	-0.12	0.19	0.10	0.01	-0.04	0.49	-0.55	0.13	-0.08	-0.39	0.58	0.16	0.06	-0.08	-0.01	0.15	-0.20	0.09	0.18	0.01	-0.03	-0.61	0.18	0.42	
AT	0.09	0.00	0.09	-0.15	-0.07	-0.10	0.16	0.49	0.00	0.22	-0.06	0.15	0.10	0.00	-0.02	0.36	-0.36	0.11	-0.06	-0.15	0.27	0.13	0.02	-0.04	-0.05	0.00	-0.12	0.05	0.09	0.05	-0.04	-0.41	0.11	-0.03	
BE	-0.03	0.00	-0.04	0.07	0.04	0.06	-0.09	-0.23	0.00	-0.10	0.03	-0.07	-0.05	0.00	0.01	-0.15	0.19	-0.03	0.03	0.08	-0.13	-0.06	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.05	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.19	-0.04	-0.02	
BF	-0.21	0.00	-0.21	0.08	-0.03	-0.02	-0.08	-0.48	-0.07	-0.27	0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06	-0.38	-0.11	-0.22	-0.02	0.18	-0.37	-0.21	-0.09	-0.08	-0.15	-0.17	0.08	-0.05	-0.13	-0.17	-0.22	0.42	-0.31	0.64	
BG	0.05	0.01	0.11	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	0.14	0.23	0.01	0.14	-0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.07	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	-0.14	0.16	0.07	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.07	-0.16	0.12	0.03	
B	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.00	-0.04	-0.03	0.06	0.17	0.00	0.07	-0.03	0.05	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.11	-0.12	0.06	-0.02	-0.07	0.08	0.03	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.05	0.00	-0.13	0.03	0.16	0.16	
BI	0.07	0.01	0.08	-0.30	-0.21	-0.23	0.43	0.75	-0.05	0.20	-0.14	0.30	0.18	-0.06	-0.10	0.54	-0.80	0.27	-0.14	-0.06	0.11	0.11	-0.04	-0.15	-0.17	-0.21	0.06	0.12	-0.02	-0.06	-0.55	-0.06	0.54		
BO	-0.14	-0.01	-0.32	0.09	0.09	0.11	-0.29	-0.69	-0.02	-0.31	0.10	-0.15	-0.11	0.00	0.01	-0.42	0.30	-0.21	0.06	0.25	-0.34	-0.17	-0.03	0.05	0.01	-0.06	-0.09	-0.04	-0.18	-0.08	-0.10	0.53	-0.21	-0.16	
BW	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.08	-0.03	0.01	-0.06	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.06	0.02	
BY	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.08	
CF	0.15	-0.01	-0.13	-0.40	-0.10	-0.08	0.49	0.35	-0.02	-0.08	-0.06	0.17	0.07	-0.04	-0.05	0.39	-0.19	0.48	-0.04	0.37	-0.36	0.06	-0.05	-0.02	0.02	-0.31	-0.13	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.07	-0.18	-0.12	-0.24	
CH	0.07	0.00	0.06	-0.13	-0.07	-0.07	0.22	0.33	-0.01	0.10	-0.05	0.10	0.07	-0.01	-0.02	0.23	-0.22	0.14	-0.04	-0.03	0.06	0.07	0.00	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.03	-0.24	0.03	0.05	
CI	-0.09	0.01	0.09	0.31	0.13	0.10	-0.29	-0.37	0.03	0.02	0.08	-0.20	-0.08	0.04	0.08	-0.41	0.40	-0.37	0.07	-0.22	0.17	-0.05	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.24	0.18	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.02	0.26	0.12	-0.04	
CL	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.08	-0.03	0.01	-0.06	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.08	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.09	-0.08	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.09	-0.02	-0.06	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.04	0.04	
CM	0.02	0.00	-0.06	-0.06	-0.07	-0.07	0.05	0.26	-0.01	0.09	-0.05	0.10	0.05	-0.01	-0.03	0.20	-0.28	0.08	-0.04	-0.07	0.12	0.04	0.00	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.09	0.03	0.05	-0.01	-0.03	-0.22	0.01	0.19	
CV	-0.22	0.00	-0.17	0.33	0.16	0.15	-0.33	-0.90	-0.02	-0.29	0.15	-0.31	-0.16	0.01	0.06	-0.79	0.60	-0.49	0.10	0.07	-0.28	-0.22	-0.03	0.06	0.02	0.09	0.29	-0.09	-0.01	-0.09	-0.08	0.73	0.12	0.04	
DE	0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.10	-0.02	-0.05	0.19	0.17	-0.01	0.08	-0.01	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.05	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.00	-0.01	-0.07	-0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.05	-0.10	0.14	-0.09	
DO	-0.12	-0.01	-0.25	0.12	0.10	0.11	-0.26	-0.63	-0.01	-0.27	0.10	-0.16	-0.11	0.01	0.02	-0.42	0.35	-0.22	0.06	0.20	-0.29	-0.15	-0.02	0.05	0.02	-0.02	0.11	-0.05	-0.15	-0.06	-0.07	0.50	-0.15	-0.17	
ES	0.00	0.00	-0.04	-0.10	-0.06	-0.07	0.10	0.17	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.09	0.05	-0.02	-0.04	0.14	-0.28	0.05	-0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.05	-0.08	-0.08	-0.07	0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.05	-0.13	-0.05	0.16	
ET	0.06	0.00	0.09	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	0.10	0.21	0.01	0.09	-0.03	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.14	-0.05	0.09	-0.01	-0.05	0.09	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.05	0.04	-0.05	-0.16	0.07	0.02	
FR	-0.04	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.06	-0.06	0.03	0.09	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.06	0.04	-0.02	0.04	0.05	-0.27	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06	-0.09	-0.05	-0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.08	-0.07	-0.06	0.35	
GE	0.09	0.00	0.06	-0.11	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	0.39	0.02	0.16	-0.06	0.15	0.06	0.01	-0.03	0.41	-0.32	0.19	-0.04	-0.09	0.26	0.12	0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.19	0.07	0.08	0.03	-0.01	-0.37	0.08	0.10	
GH	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.09	0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.06	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.05	-0.04	0.10	-0.13	
GN	-0.10	0.00	0.02	0.15	0.02	0.01	-0.13	-0.19	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.07	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.23	0.02	-0.22	0.00	-0.10	0.04	-0.07	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	0.06	0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.07	0.14	0.03	0.31	
GQ	0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.08	-0.01	-0.04	0.17	0.10	-0.01	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.06	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08	-0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.05	0.03	-0.08	0.01	
GT	-0.11	-0.01	-0.25	0.11	0.10	0.11	-0.29	-0.61	-0.01	-0.25	0.10	-0.15	-0.10	0.01	0.02	-0.39	0.32	-0.20	0.06	0.19	-0.25	-0.14	-0.02	0.06	0.02	-0.01	0.09	-0.04	-0.15	-0.05	-0.07	0.46	-0.14	-0.20	
GW	0.33	0.00	0.20	-0.42	-0.14	-0.05	0.67	0.78	0.03	0.06	-0.14	0.22	0.08	-0.02	-0.04	0.75	-0.07	0.90	-0.02	0.32	-0.26	0.18	0.00	0.02	0.23	-0.24	-0.22	0.03	0.17	0.15	0.24	-0.51	0.06	-0.32	
GY	-0.06	-0.01	-0.27	0.01	0.11	0.08	-0.12	-0.47	-0.01	-0.18	0.10	-0.14	-0.07	0.02	0.05	-0.34	0.34	-0.23	0.05	0.16	-0.20	-0.08	-0.01	0.07	-0.01	-0.01	0.12	-0.04	-0.14	0.01	0.38	-0.07	-0.47	0.01	
HN	-0.04	-0.01	-0.18	0.01	0.02	0.08	-0.24	-0.34	0.04	-0.26	0.03	-0.02	-0.08	-0.01	0.04	-0.05	0.12	0.15	0.04	0.30	-0.31	-0.10	-0.02	0.04	0.11	-0.10	-0.07	-0.01	0.04	-0.06	-0.08	0.26	-0.26	-0.36	
IL	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.02	
IS	0.01	0.00	-0.16	-0.16	0.01	-0.06	0.27	0.04	-0.03	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.05	-0.01	0.02	-0.08	-0.03	-0.13	-0.02	0.05	-0.08	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.13	-0.10	-0.08	-0.02	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.23	
IT	0.03	0.00	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.03	-0.14	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.04	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.07	-0.06	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.08	0.05	-0.07	
JM	-0.10	-0.02	-0.38	0.01	0.10	0.10	-0.26	-0.63	-0.02	-0.30	0.11	-0.13	-0.10	0.01	0.01	-0.35	0.30	-0.18	0.06	0.29	-0.33	-0.13	-0.03	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.07	-0.04	-0.19	-0.04	0.07	0.49	-0.19	-0.42	
KE	0.02	0.02	0.19	0.10	-0.02	0.33	0.12	0.01	0.28	0.06	-0.17	0.04	0.04	0.14	0.35	0.34	-0.48	0.02	-0.40	0.32	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.15	0.21	0.32	-0.05	0.04	0.13	0.20	0.01	0.33	-0.27	0.00	
KH	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.06	0.04	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.08	0.00	
LA	0.03	0.00	0.05	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.08	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.0								

UNTREATED COUNTRIES (ROWS) / TREATED COUNTRIES (COLUMNS)	AE	BH	BR	BT	CA	CR	CY	CZ	DZ	EE	FI	GB	GR	HR	HU	ID	IL	IN	JO	KZ	UK	LT	LV	MN	MU	NL	NO	NP	NZ	PL	RO	SA	SE	TR	
AL	0.04	0.00	0.11	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.16	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.18	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.06	0.00	-0.03	0.00	-0.03	0.12	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.05	-0.03	
AM	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
AO	0.04	-0.02	0.43	0.21	-0.07	0.03	-0.20	0.53	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.81	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.30	0.27	0.14	-0.01	-0.20	0.80	0.12	0.07	-0.01	0.13	-0.09	-0.10	0.06	0.29	-0.02	-0.03	-0.09	0.19	0.34	
AT	0.03	0.00	0.07	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.10	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.07	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.02	
BE	0.03	0.00	0.07	-0.05	-0.01	0.00	0.09	0.08	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	0.06	-0.12	0.00	0.02	-0.07	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.03	0.09	-0.02	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	
BF	-0.29	0.05	-0.48	-0.11	0.04	-0.12	0.02	-0.74	-0.11	-0.11	-0.04	-0.71	0.05	-0.07	-0.13	-0.41	-0.24	-0.07	-0.03	0.21	0.75	-0.27	-0.12	-0.14	-0.19	0.30	-0.05	0.00	-0.30	-0.19	-0.34	0.11	-0.39	0.77	
BG	0.09	-0.01	0.25	-0.01	-0.05	0.02	0.06	0.37	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.40	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.09	0.00	-0.17	-0.01	-0.06	0.27	0.06	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.11	0.11	-0.01	0.13	0.03	0.10	-0.02	0.10	-0.07	
BI	0.05	0.00	0.21	0.01	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.27	0.02	0.00	-0.03	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.03	0.01	-0.04	0.21	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.05	0.04	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.10	
BJ	0.24	0.03	0.62	-0.49	-0.23	-0.08	0.45	1.25	0.00	-0.24	-0.37	1.57	0.07	-0.06	0.02	0.35	-0.61	-0.23	-0.07	0.17	0.15	0.07	-0.09	-0.06	-0.09	-0.13	0.29	-0.05	0.40	-0.08	0.08	-0.04	-0.08	0.35	
BO	-0.22	0.00	-0.62	0.19	0.16	0.01	-0.23	-1.00	-0.04	0.09	0.20	-1.22	-0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.31	0.29	0.13	0.04	0.00	-0.40	-0.11	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.17	-0.20	0.02	-0.36	0.01	-0.13	0.05	-0.09	-0.16	
BW	0.03	0.00	0.11	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.10	-0.07	0.00	-0.03	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.04	0.06	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.00	
BY	0.02	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.07	
CF	0.31	0.03	0.09	-0.73	-0.13	-0.07	0.60	0.72	-0.03	-0.34	-0.50	0.72	0.05	-0.05	0.02	0.29	-0.30	0.17	-0.03	0.43	0.71	0.05	-0.12	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.18	-0.08	0.13	0.02	0.18	-0.01	-0.23	-0.51	
CH	0.13	0.00	0.25	-0.19	-0.08	-0.01	0.17	0.54	0.01	-0.08	-0.13	0.64	0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.19	-0.20	-0.05	-0.02	0.05	0.12	0.06	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.08	0.10	-0.02	0.17	0.00	0.08	-0.03	0.02	-0.04	
CI	-0.18	-0.02	-0.09	0.50	0.11	0.06	-0.35	-0.62	0.02	0.24	0.33	-0.76	-0.06	0.04	0.02	-0.30	0.45	-0.16	0.04	-0.27	0.29	-0.05	0.08	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.06	0.03	-0.15	0.03	-0.05	0.04	0.16	0.16	
CL	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.10	0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.02	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.03
CM	0.05	0.01	-0.15	-0.11	-0.07	-0.03	0.06	0.39	0.00	-0.06	-0.07	0.55	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.16	0.30	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.19	0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.14	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	0.13	
CV	-0.36	0.01	-0.60	0.39	0.20	0.00	-0.28	-1.39	-0.06	0.16	0.29	-1.70	-0.05	0.00	-0.06	-0.66	0.53	-0.12	0.04	-0.66	-0.55	-0.25	-0.01	-0.03	-0.12	0.23	-0.11	0.01	-0.48	-0.05	-0.22	0.14	-0.13	0.35	
DE	0.06	0.00	0.03	-0.13	-0.02	-0.01	0.12	0.14	0.00	-0.05	-0.07	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.01	0.07	-0.11	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.07	-0.02	0.02	0.06	0.00	-0.02	-0.14	0.00	
DG	-0.23	0.00	0.57	0.18	0.14	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.07	0.17	1.17	-0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.27	0.11	0.03	0.02	0.05	-0.14	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.18	-0.17	0.02	-0.35	-0.02	0.15	0.06	-0.12	0.00	
ES	0.05	0.02	0.10	-0.22	-0.07	-0.05	0.15	0.33	-0.02	-0.13	-0.18	0.47	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.13	0.07	-0.03	0.13	0.11	0.00	-0.05	-0.04	0.00	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.10	-0.06	-0.04	-0.02	-0.11	0.20	0.00	
ET	0.10	-0.01	0.21	-0.05	-0.04	0.01	0.07	0.35	0.02	-0.02	-0.06	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.14	0.04	0.00	-0.01	0.17	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.08	0.05	-0.01	0.13	0.06	-0.03	-0.03	0.07	-0.09	0.27	
FR	0.00	0.02	0.07	-0.12	-0.05	-0.04	0.08	0.18	-0.02	-0.08	-0.10	0.30	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.04	-0.24	-0.01	-0.02	0.07	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.00	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.09	0.27	
GE	0.08	-0.01	-0.14	-0.03	-0.04	0.01	-0.02	0.35	0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.46	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.22	-0.16	0.07	-0.01	-0.04	0.32	0.10	0.03	0.02	0.06	-0.07	-0.03	0.02	0.14	0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.09	-0.14	
GH	0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.07	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.05	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.07	-0.13	0.00	-0.08	0.21	0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.07	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.09	-0.12	
GN	-0.16	0.01	-0.10	0.18	0.04	-0.01	-0.15	-0.34	-0.02	0.07	0.12	-0.32	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.19	0.01	-0.10	0.00	-0.07	0.04	-0.08	0.00	-0.05	-0.06	0.08	-0.04	-0.02	-0.09	-0.06	-0.14	0.03	-0.03	0.41	
GQ	0.06	0.01	0.04	-0.15	-0.03	-0.02	0.14	0.20	-0.01	-0.05	-0.05	0.19	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.15	-0.01	0.06	0.06	0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.07	-0.04	-0.11	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.01	-0.02	-0.11	
GT	-0.22	0.00	-0.58	0.17	0.14	0.00	-0.22	-0.94	-0.04	0.07	0.18	-1.12	-0.02	0.01	-0.06	-0.31	0.22	0.12	0.03	0.01	-0.39	-0.12	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.17	-0.18	0.02	-0.34	-0.01	0.15	0.05	-0.10	-0.05	
GW	0.60	-0.01	0.76	-0.69	-0.21	0.01	0.71	1.47	0.06	-0.34	-0.67	1.48	0.00	-0.03	0.10	0.62	0.09	0.41	0.00	0.34	-0.35	0.21	-0.05	0.11	0.14	-0.22	0.03	0.14	-0.02	0.11	0.44	-0.08	-0.01	-0.73	
GY	-0.08	0.00	-0.38	0.04	0.10	0.01	-0.05	-0.54	-0.02	0.05	0.14	-0.76	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.22	0.28	-0.11	0.02	0.01	-0.29	-0.05	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.04	-0.01	-0.11	-0.23	0.05	0.01	0.05	-0.03	-0.35	
HN	-0.10	0.00	-0.30	0.09	0.07	0.00	-0.15	-0.47	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.50	-0.01	0.00	-0.07	-0.04	0.02	0.36	0.02	0.04	-0.23	-0.04	0.01	-0.01	0.11	0.14	-0.22	0.03	0.14	-0.02	-0.11	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08	0.01
IQ	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	
IS	0.03	0.01	-0.07	-0.11	0.00	-0.01	0.09	0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.14	-0.01	0.05	-0.10	0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.07	-0.02	0.07	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.01	-0.02	-0.18	
IT	0.07	-0.06	0.42	0.58	0.05	0.15	-0.37	0.08	0.12	0.29	0.26	0.00	-0.10	0.08	0.09	0.13	0.53	0.14	0.07	-0.41	0.88	0.17	0.17	0.11	0.23	-0.20	-0.09	0.04	0.17	0.15	0.18	-0.07	0.44	-0.24	
JM	-0.21	0.00	-0.76	0.06	0.16	-0.01	-0.18	-1.00	-0.05	0.03	0.17	-1.21	0.00	0.01	-0.06	-0.27	0.16	0.17	0.03	0.08	-0.53	-0.11	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.19	-0.22	0.02	0.40	0.01	-0.14	0.04	-0.05	-0.32	
KE	0.07	-0.01	0.26	0.15	0.01	0.06	0.05	0.18	0.03	0.16	0.19	-0.02	-0.04	0.04	0.13	-0.17	0.44	-0.64	0.01	-0.20	0.35	0.04	0.04	0.07	-0.17	-0.22	0.31	-0.05	0.04	0.11	0.22	0.05	0.23	-0.26	
KH	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06
LA	0.06	0.00	0.12	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.06	0.16	0.01	-0.01	-0.04	0.15	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.												

UNTREATED COUNTRIES (ROWS) / TREATED COUNTRIES (COLUMNS)	AE	BH	BR	BT	CA	CR	CY	CZ	DE	EZ	FI	GB	GR	HR	HU	ID	IL	IN	JO	KZ	LK	LT	LV	MN	MU	NL	NO	NZ	NP	PL	RO	SA	SE	TR	
AI	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.04	-0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	-0.01	
AM	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
AO	-0.16	0.06	0.25	0.17	0.04	0.07	-0.35	0.08	0.13	-0.10	0.21	0.22	0.09	0.10	0.02	0.14	-0.35	0.25	-0.03	-0.13	0.77	0.16	0.14	0.04	-0.08	-0.33	-0.59	0.15	0.06	0.04	-0.14	0.15	0.20	0.44	
AT	0.03	-0.02	0.09	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.11	-0.04	-0.04	0.09	0.01	-0.08	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	-0.09	0.20	-0.19	0.06	0.01	-0.18	-0.07	-0.04	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.30	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.05	0.10	
BE	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.07	0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.08	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.04	-0.08	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.14	0.04	0.03	0.01	-0.02	0.06	-0.12	0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	
BF	-0.15	0.01	0.20	0.15	-0.03	-0.07	-0.03	0.07	-0.06	0.01	-0.36	-0.03	0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.15	-0.15	-0.32	-0.08	0.05	-0.02	-0.11	-0.07	-0.08	-0.21	0.20	0.24	-0.02	-0.06	-0.07	-0.16	-0.02	-0.09	0.56	
BG	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.02	-0.07	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.10	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.15	0.04	0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.07	-0.11	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.05	-0.02	
BI	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.05	0.07	-0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.09	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.07	
BJ	-0.04	0.01	-0.27	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.10	0.04	0.03	-0.14	-0.32	0.22	0.02	-0.01	-0.04	0.10	-0.33	0.36	-0.12	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0.15	-0.42	0.05	0.02	-0.02	-0.07	0.01	0.00	-0.04	
BO	-0.04	-0.01	-0.29	0.01	-0.03	-0.07	0.08	-0.07	-0.08	0.04	-0.20	-0.15	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	-0.14	0.01	-0.35	-0.04	0.07	-0.23	-0.11	-0.08	-0.06	-0.13	0.21	0.36	-0.06	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.11	0.12	
BW	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.05	-0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.03	
BY	0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.08	
CF	-0.24	-0.06	-0.28	-0.27	-0.04	-0.03	0.27	0.02	-0.05	-0.06	-0.31	0.07	-0.08	-0.07	-0.04	0.07	0.13	0.41	0.04	0.13	-0.68	-0.03	-0.07	0.02	0.23	0.34	-0.04	-0.09	0.01	-0.01	0.19	-0.12	-0.14	-0.86	
CH	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.02	0.07	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.05	-0.09	0.13	-0.03	0.00	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.17	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.05	
CJ	-0.10	0.03	0.22	0.11	0.03	0.03	-0.13	-0.01	0.03	0.06	0.33	-0.12	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.04	0.01	-0.31	0.05	-0.08	0.37	0.02	0.04	0.01	-0.11	-0.25	0.09	0.05	-0.01	0.03	-0.07	0.07	0.09	0.36	
CL	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	
CM	-0.05	0.01	-0.07	0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.07	0.01	0.02	-0.05	-0.09	0.08	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.15	0.09	0.04	0.00	0.12	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.04	0.02	-0.16	0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.05	0.02	0.01	0.00	
CV	-1.12	0.02	0.03	0.11	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.07	-0.04	0.11	0.19	-0.27	0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.16	0.09	-0.61	0.04	-0.02	0.13	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	-0.19	0.28	0.44	-0.02	-0.07	-0.01	-0.10	0.01	0.00	0.43	
DE	0.05	-0.01	0.24	-0.06	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.10	-0.05	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.00	0.02	0.00	-0.07	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	-0.02	0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.19	
DO	0.03	0.01	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.03	0.00	-0.04	0.06	0.03	-0.16	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.09	0.11	-0.28	0.02	0.02	-0.13	-0.05	-0.04	0.02	-0.05	0.04	0.23	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.05	0.02	
ES	0.06	-0.02	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.07	0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.30	0.18	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.31	-0.03	0.04	-0.22	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.10	0.15	-0.14	-0.02	0.03	-0.04	0.04	-0.04	-0.06	-0.10		
ET	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02	
FR	0.03	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.11	0.09	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.14	-0.01	0.01	-0.09	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.06	0.05	-0.06	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.04	
GE	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.09	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	-0.09	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.06	
GH	-0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.07	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.16	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.05	-0.06	0.00	-0.02	0.17	0.04	0.03	0.01	-0.05	-0.09	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05	-0.02
GN	-0.10	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.00	-0.01	-0.09	-0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.04	-0.09	-0.16	-0.01	-0.03	0.19	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.11	0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.09	0.03	0.02	0.36	
GQ	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.08	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.07	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.04	0.01	-0.06	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.14	
GT	0.00	-0.01	-0.06	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.06	-0.04	-0.04	0.05	0.06	-0.16	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	0.10	-0.28	0.02	0.02	-0.11	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.06	0.03	0.27	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	
GW	0.38	-0.09	0.10	-0.26	-0.04	0.02	0.39	0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.36	0.31	-0.13	-0.08	0.04	0.14	0.35	0.85	0.05	0.09	-0.85	-0.01	0.05	0.05	0.51	0.27	-0.18	-0.11	0.09	0.00	0.35	-0.13	-0.13	-0.94	
GY	0.02	-0.01	-0.20	-0.11	0.00	-0.03	0.06	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.11	-0.24	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.05	0.06	-0.28	-0.01	0.05	-0.15	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.08	0.07	0.25	-0.04	-0.05	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.29		
HN	0.10	-0.05	-0.27	-0.08	-0.05	-0.06	0.24	-0.05	-0.09	0.02	-0.42	0.01	-0.07	-0.09	-0.04	-0.09	0.14	0.02	0.03	0.11	-0.59	-0.12	-0.11	-0.04	0.07	0.35	0.28	-0.10	-0.03	0.06	0.07	-0.11	-0.18	-0.20	
IQ	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.07	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	
IS	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.06	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.08	
IT	0.28	-0.07	0.47	-0.09	-0.02	0.06	0.25	0.07	0.02	0.02	-0.15	0.38	-0.10	-0.03	-0.02	0.13	0.36	0.79	0.12	-0.01	-0.47	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.49	0.00	-0.25	-0.05	0.12	0.02	0.30	-0.05	-0.03	-0.43	
JM	0.00	-0.01	-0.29	-0.08	-0.02	-0.05	0.09	-0.05	-0.06	0.02	-0.07	-0.21	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.09	0.04	-0.30	-0.03	0.07	-0.25	-0.08	-0.07	-0.03	-0.10	0.18	0.31	-0.06	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.09	-0.16	
KE	-0.03	0.03	0.21	-0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.09	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.64	-0.31	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.11	-0.38	0.08	-0.07	0.32	0.06	0.05	0.05	-0.09	0.32	0.14	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.13	-0.15	
KH	-0.01	0.00	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	
LA	0.02	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.04	0.								



Appendix B. Robustness checks

See Figs. B.1–B.3.






Fig. B.1. Trends in wealth inequality, alternative conditioning factors.

Note: The figure shows the average treatment effect of MaPP on the treated countries (ATT). “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration. “Wealth” is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. The outcome values refer to five years ( $T_0 + 5$ ) after the treatment year ( $T_0$ ). The estimated values based on the synthetic controls are computed using a two-way fixed effects model that accounts for unobserved country-specific and time-specific confounders. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level. The covariates include financial development, government expenditure on education, inflation, population growth, and real GDP per capita. The optimal number of factors is selected using cross-validation to minimize the MSPE.



**Fig. B.2. Trends in wealth inequality, fiscal policy.**

*Note:* The figure shows the average treatment effect of MaPP on the treated countries (ATT). “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration. “Wealth” is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. The outcome values refer to five years ( $T_0 + 5$ ) after the treatment year ( $T_0$ ). The estimated values based on the synthetic controls are computed using a two-way fixed effects model that accounts for unobserved country-specific and time-specific confounders. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level. The covariates include average education, financial development, government subsidies as a proxy for fiscal policy, inflation, population, and real GDP per capita. The optimal number of factors is selected using cross-validation to minimize the MSPE.



**Fig. B.3. Trends in wealth inequality, unconventional monetary policy.**

*Note:* The figure shows the average treatment effect of MaPP on the treated countries (ATT). “Gini Index, Wealth” is the Gini index of wealth concentration. “Wealth” is the wealth share held by the top 1%, top 10% and bottom 50% groups in each country. The outcome values refer to five years ( $T_0 + 5$ ) after the treatment year ( $T_0$ ). The estimated values based on the synthetic controls are computed using a two-way fixed effects model that accounts for unobserved country-specific and time-specific confounders. Standard errors are based on 1,000 parametric bootstraps at the country level. The covariates include average education, financial development, forward guidance as a proxy for unconventional monetary policy, inflation, population, and real GDP per capita. The optimal number of factors is selected using cross-validation to minimize the MSPE.

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